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CRITIQUES OF THE LIMITS OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT:
A REJOINDER©
By

MICHAEL

This rejoinder to the foregoing critiques of the author's
book, The Limits of Freedom of Contract, focuses on
several themes: a) what range of contractually-related
issues do courts possess the requisite institutional
competence to address? b) whether problematic
normative issues in contract law are amenable to
rational analysis and at least provisional resolution, or
are inherently indeterminate, contingent, and political?
c) what the value of individual autonomy implies in
terms of the type of transactions parties should be
permitted to engage in? d) whether an "internal" rather
than consequentialist theory of contract law is
conceivable? and e) whether autonomy values are
inconsistent with welfare values in women's
participation in market activities?

J. TREBILCOCK*
En r6ponse aux critiques precddentes de l'oeuvre The
Limits of Freedom of Contract, l'auteur examine les
sujets suivants: a) quelle est la port6e de la juridiction
inh6rente des tribunaux quant aux questions
contractuelles? b) les questions th~oriques du droit des
contrats peuvent-elles 8tre 6tudiees de fagon rationelle
afin d'obtenir une r6solution logique ou, au contraire,
sont-elles d'un caract re ind6termin6, contingent, et
essentiellement politique? c) que signifie Ie principe de
l'autonomie personnelle relativement au type de
transactions qui devraient 8tre permises aux parties
contractantes? d) est-il possible d'envisager une th6orie
contractuelle soit ointerne plut6t que simplement
accessoire aux autres domaines juridiques? e) les
valeurs autonomistes sont-elles en contradiction avec
les valeurs sociales 6tatiques v6hicun6es par la
participation des femmes au march66conomique?
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RICHARD CRASWELL, "REMEDIES WHEN CONTRACTS
LACK CONSENT: AUTONOMY AND INSTITUTIONAL
COMPETENCE"1

In offering a rejoinder to Professor Craswell's critiques of my
book, I should acknowledge a deep sense of gratitude to Professor
Craswell, who was one of the reviewers retained by Harvard University
Press to review the manuscript. After some laudatory, and I hope not
perfunctory, comments at the beginning of his review, he offered twentynine single-spaced pages of detailed critical comments, which led me to
make major revisions to the manuscript in almost every chapter,
substantially improving the book (whatever its remaining deficiencies).
Thus, I view Professor Craswell's criticisms today as a stubborn residual
that has defied all reasonable attempts at accommodation on my part.
Professor Craswell's method of critique is to take seriously, as I
do, autonomy-based rationales for freedom of contract and then to focus
on implications of the requirement of consent, which is necessarily
integral to such theories of contractual obligation. As I argue in my
book, and as Professor Craswell accepts, consent to contractual
obligations may be claimed to be absent or deficient for two broad
reasons: coercion, or imperfect information.
While the conceptual issues involved in developing a coherent
theory of coercion, or a coherent theory of asymmetric information, are
daunting, Professor Craswell suggests that these issues can be sidestepped to some extent by focusing on the remedial options open to
courts, that is, by taking account of their relative institutional
competence to fashion appropriate remedies. In some cases-for
example, gun-at-the-head coercion cases and fraud cases-a court's
response may be straightforward. Where the contract is fully executory,
or where rescission would readily lead to a restoration of the status quo
ante, a simple declaration of the invalidity of the contract may be the
only response called for from the courts. Howevei, in other cases, where
goods or services provided under the impugned contract have been
consumed, or cannot be restored for other reasons, or where the party
seeking relief would find full restoration of the status quo ante highly
disadvantageous, the remedial options open to the courts are less
straightforward. The options would typically entail the courts' upholding
the contract while substituting some more reasonable set of terms for
those actually employed in the contract and impugned on the grounds of
1 (1995)

33 Osgoode Hall LJ. 209.
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either coercion or information asymmetry. In these cases, Professor
Craswell expresses serious reservations as to the ability of the courts to
craft alternative "reasonable" terms of their own in substitution for the
terms apparently consented to by the parties. He also suggests that, in
most cases, the courts may be well-advised to enforce the terms of the
contract as written, despite objections that they have not been truly
consented to. I am largely unpersuaded by Professor Craswell's critique
and proposal, which seems to me to lead to a very austere and
impoverished role for the law of contracts.
Let me take first the case of coercion and my foundering ship
example,2 upon which Professor Craswell focuses. It is true that, in this
example, the foundering ship owner, who is induced to pay an excessive
salvage fee to the only tug operator in the vicinity, would not rationally
seek rescission of the contract and the restoration of the status quo ante,
but would rather seek the substitution of a more reasonable salvage fee
than that apparently agreed to. In arguing that the courts should be
prepared to perform such a role in this class of case, I draw a crucial
distinction (of which Professor Craswell is sceptical) between situational
and structural monopolies. I view the foundering ship case as a
situational monopoly that does not reflect broader or systemic
competitive problems in the tug industry, but that reflects the
serendipitous circumstances of the interaction between the two parties
in question. I distinguish this type of case from the kind of structural
monopolies traditionally exemplified by natural monopolies in utility
industries, such as electricity and telecommunications, where we have
typically seen the creation of specialized administrative agencies to
review and approve the pricing and related policies adopted by such
monopolies. Professor Craswell argues that a well-conceived legal
intervention is no easier in the one case than in the other, and that if we
believe that the courts are not well-equipped to be assigned the
responsibility for the legal oversight of structural monopolies, then they
are no more likely to perform well in disciplining the contractual
conduct of situational monopolies. I disagree with his conclusion.
One observes that in most jurisdictions in both the common law
and the civil law worlds, structural monopolies are regulated by
specialized administrative agencies, and that the more ad hoc forms of
monopolization characteristic of situational monopolies are left to be
dealt with by the courts under doctrines such as duress,
unconscionability, and iiequality of bargaining power. There are good
2 M.J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1993) at 85.
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reasons for this basic institutional division of labour. It is true, as
Professor Craswell argues, that in the case of structural monopolies,
regulatory agencies have generally not done a very good job (from an
economic perspective) in regulating price, output, investment, and
operating cost decisions. This leads to increased pressure to deregulate
many of these industries where technological developments render
competitive options feasible. Alternatively, price-cap forms of
regulation might be substituted for rate-of-return regulation because of
ease of administration and more desirable incentive properties.
However, so far as I know, no one has suggested that ongoing regulation
of these structural monopolies would be better remitted to the courts,
whatever the imperfections in the current regulatory processes. On the
other hand, since the last century, courts in both Great Britain and the
United States, in cases akin to the foundering ship example, have
routinely substituted reasonable salvage terms for extravagant ones
extracted under coercion. 3 Similarly, in European civil law systems, the
doctrine of duress has conventionally been applied to precisely this type
of case in order to enable courts to substitute more reasonable terms for
those apparently agreed to, but only under coercive threat.4 There are
good reasons for supposing that legal oversight of situational
monopolies is likely to be substantially easier than legal oversight of
structural monopolies. By definition, there are many competitive
reference points in the industry to which the courts can have recourse in
establishing normal, reasonable prices for the kind of tasks in issue, but
where the potential for coercion is absent. By contrast, when an entire
industry is monopolized, as in the case of structural monopolies, these
competitive reference points are, by definition, absent, or require much
more speculative and contestable extrapolations from experience in
other industries or other jurisdictions. Moreover, given the ad hoc and
eclectic range of circumstances likely to arise in situational monopolies,
it is far from clear how one could set up a specialized administrative
agency that could credibly assert expertise superior to that of the courts
across the whole range of settings in which these problems are likely to
arise.
I take a similar view with regard to the second broad category
that Professor Craswell addresses-information imperfections-using as
the example an apparently disadvantageous term in a standard-form
3 See Akerblom v. Price, Potter,Walker, & Co. (1881), 7 Q.B. 129 (C.A.); The Port Caledonia
andtheAnna, [1903] P. 184; Post v.Jones, 60 U.S. 618 (1857).
4 See J.P. Dawson, "Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and German Law"
(1937) 11 Tul. L. Rev. 345 at 353-55.
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contract, which the consumer did not read or understand. On the
assumption that it is either not feasible to cancel the entire transaction,
or that it would be disadvantageous to the consumer who consumed, or
wishes to retain, the goods or services in question, the courts again face
the problem of (a) insisting on real consent (through requirements of
specific explanation) as a precondition to enforceability (not a realistic
option, as Professor Craswell and I agree); (b) substituting some
alternative set of terms; or (c) simply ignoring the problem and
enforcing the contract as written (which Professor Craswell advocates).
As in the coercion cases, this view seems to entail a much too
impoverished role for the law of contract. In my discussion of the
problems presented by standard-form contracts in the book,5 I argue
that courts, in evaluating the fairness of standard-form contracts in the
kind of cases that Professor Craswell has in mind, should investigate
whether a consumer seeking relief from particular contractual provisions
has received a deal that is significantly inferior-in either the explicit
terms of the contract or in the performance provided by the other party
under it-to the deal realized by marginal consumers in the same
market, with the economic as opposed to personal characteristics of
consumers in these two classes held constant. By marginal consumers I
mean informed, sophisticated, and aggressive consumers, who
understand the terms of standard-form contracts on offer, and who
either negotiate over those terms or switch their business readily to
competing suppliers offering more favourable terms. In other words,
where a supplier has deliberately exploited a consumer's ignorance of
terms generally available in the market for like goods or services to
consumers in an economically similar situation, in order to extract terms
substantially inferior to the generally prevailing ones, a supplier's actions
should be viewed as unconscionable, and courts should feel free to
substitute more reasonable terms, not necessarily inventing them out of
whole cloth but, as in the coercion cases, by drawing on empiricallyobservable reference points elsewhere in the same market. By way of
analogy to the distinction I draw between situational and structural
monopolies, I explicitly argue, in my discussion of standard-form
contracts, that in markets so badly disrupted by imperfect information
that there is no identifiable margin of informed consumers from which
appropriate reference points can be derived, judicial sniping in case-bycase litigation is less appropriate than the kind of legislative or
regulatory intervention that has occurred in many jurisdictions, for
example, with respect to various types of door-to-door sales. Thus, I
5 Trebilcock, supra note 2 at 119-20.
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believe that I have been both consistent and realistic, in terms of relative
institutional competence, in the role that I would assign to the courts in
policing both coercion and information asymmetries.
While Professor Craswell, in his comments on my book, does not
explicitly address the kind of symmetric information imperfections that
have traditionally been addressed under doctrines of mutual mistake or
frustration, the position he takes on coercion and information
asymmetries would seem to yield equally uncompelling implications in
this third type of case. The paradigmatic case that I have in mind is a
long-term contract where the expectations of the parties are disturbed by
the occurrence of some contingency, and where the party that would be
disadvantaged by continuing performance of the contract seeks relief on
the grounds of frustration. Unless one takes the very strong position
espoused by Professor Triantis6 that all contracts should be viewed as, at
least implicitly, impounding in their initial terms all future contingencies,
one has to contemplate the possibility that some contracts will be
incomplete. Some contracts will be incomplete in the sense that the
parties neither explicitly nor implicitly can reasonably be viewed as
having agreed to any particular risk allocation with respect to the
contingency that is now in issue. Here, once one has assumed or
concluded that the parties have not consented to anything in particular
with respect to the contingency in question, to argue that the contract
should be enforced as written, because the courts are unlikely to do a
better job than the parties in formulating an alternative set of terms, is
by hypothesis an irrelevant response. If the contract is incomplete, then
it is silent on the issue in question and the parties simply have not
brought their minds to bear on it. While I argue in my book for a
relatively conservative view of when such contingencies have not been
considered, at least in a contract between two sophisticated commercial
parties, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to reject altogether the
possibility that there will be some small subset of risks-perhaps quite
outlandish risks, as I refer to them 7-which the parties to the contract
cannot be viewed as having consented to allocate in any particular way.
In this case, it is possible that the courts could take the view, as they
traditionally have, that the only remedy open to the parties is simply to
cancel the contract as of the date of the occurrence of the frustrating
event and let all losses lie where they fall. However, for reasons that
have been well explored in the legal literature on the doctrine of
6 G.G. Triantis, "Contractual Allocations of Unknown Risks: A Critique of the Doctrine of
Commercial Impracticability" (1992) 42 U.T.LJ. 450.
7

Trebilcock, supra note 2 at 144-46.
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frustration, this is often a very crude remedial response in that the
disadvantaged party, by successfully invoking the doctrine of frustration,
can now throw all losses on the other party. Conversely, to enforce the
contract as literally written in these circumstances is likely to cast all the
losses from the occurrence of the contingency on the party seeking to
avoid further performance. In such situations, I think a plausible case
can be made for some intermediate solution that entails risk- or losssplitting (imperfectly recognized in FrustratedContractsActs), 8 perhaps
by applying a relatively crude but clear rule of a 50/50 split of the losses,
leaving parties, in light of this rule, to contract away from it ex ante if
they so choose. Like Professor Craswell, I am sceptical of the wisdom of
courts attempting to reformulate entire sets of contract terms more or
less out of thin air, as the court attempted to do in the well-known
American case of Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc.9 A nonmandatory across-the-board rule of risk-splitting in this small subset of
cases, while crude, may be superior to rank judicial ad hocery of the kind
exemplified in Alcoa, or to looking for competitive benchmarks
elsewhere in the industry regarding how contracting parties who have
addressed the type of risk in question have chosen to allocate it when, in
many of these large long-term contacts, the nature of the contractual
relationship is sui generis and alternative competitive reference points
(unlike the coercion and standard form contract cases discussed above)
may not be readily available.
I do not pretend that the role of the courts in policing for
coercion, information asymmetries, or symmetrical information failures
in contractual relationships is easy. However, it is far from clear to me
that, if properly structured, this task is any more complicated than the
thousand-and-one other factual and legal determinations that courts
must make every day in civil litigation, let alone in more complex public
law litigation.
II. ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, "MICHAEL AND ME: A POSTMODERN FRIENDSHIP" 10
As always, Allan Hutchinson's comments represent a refreshing
and invigorating challenge to more conventional thinking, and I am

8 See, for example, The FrustratedContractsAct, R.S.O. 1990, c. F-34.
9 499 F. Supp. 53 (D. Pa. 1980) [hereinafter Alcoa].
10 (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 237.
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delighted to reply to them in the same vigorous vein. Allan and I have
been friends for many years, but I sense from his comments on my book
that our friendship is a source of some anguish to him. At the start of his
comments, he worries that our friendship has led to a compatibility of
viewpoints on many issues, which might suggest momentary lapses of
progressive denial on his part, or provide evidence that he and other
Critical Legal Scholars are not the progressives they proclaim themselves
to be, but middle-of-the-roaders masquerading in radicals' clothing. On
the other hand, at the end of his comments, he sounds a note of wistful
regret over my failure to accept his invitation to follow him through the
Red Sea to the post-modernist promised land beyond and thus, it seems,
preventing a full consummation of our friendship. Nothing I am about
to say in these comments is likely to ease Allan's anxieties, and may
indeed exacerbate them.
Allan's first line of critique of my book is to suggest that I have
been a post-modernist all along without knowing it or, at least, without
admitting it. His basis for this claim is that my book is shot through with
a post-modern emphasis on contingency and indeterminacy. He claims
that the result of my analysis, in almost all cases, is that it is "too close to
call."11 I believe that this criticism is both unfounded and unfair. In
exploring the limits of freedom of contract, I consciously chose to
analyze a range of difficult and controversial cases such as blood
donation, organ transplantation, pornography, immigration, free trade,
prostitution, surrogacy, and racial discrimination. This seems a readily
defensible strategy in that, had I chosen commercial contracts for the
sale of cargoes of corn or consumer contracts for the purchase of tubes
of toothpaste to test the limits of markets, I would rightly have attracted
from Allan and others the charge of rigging the deck by tackling easy
cases. However, in analysing the hard cases that I do address, with a
view to testing as searchingly as possible the limits of markets and
freedom of contract, I make a conscious attempt to canvass fairly and
sympathetically a broad range of views from different normative
perspectives taken on most of these issues. A number of commentators
have noted that this is one of the more distinctive features of the book.
In reviewing these perspectives on particular controversies, there is
obviously an "on the one hand, on the other hand" tone to the analysis.
However, in every case, I reach rather concrete normative conclusions
(sometimes with difficulty, and albeit provisionally) as to how these
controversies should be resolved. In hardly any cases do I regard the
issues as too close to call. Indeed, given the intensity of the normative
11 Ibid. at 240.
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controversies surrounding most of these issues, I am more vulnerable to
the opposing charge of being tendentious in reaching conclusions where
others with a greater sense of self-preservation may fear to tread.
Indeed, Allan simultaneously accuses me of this failing when he refers to
my "anxiety to craft solutions that are somehow apt for all times and
places," and to my vulnerablity to the temptation to seek "theoretical
finality and practical dogma."1 2 Surely, I cannot simultaneously be open
to both charges.
Another line of critique that Allan develops rests on my failure
to offer a meta-theory that weighs or ranks various core values of
autonomy, efficiency, distributive justice, and communitarianism that I
address throughout the book. Instead I suggest that significant progress
can be made at a lower level of abstraction by identifying the institutions
or instruments available to a community which are best able to vindicate
these values, given that all of them appear to have cogency in particular
contexts. I appreciate that among high theorists it is fashionable to
denigrate moral pluralism. I have never understood this penchant. As a
matter of simple intuition, each of us in the various facets of our lives
attempts to vindicate, to some extent or another, all of these values. As I
state in the book, a one-value view of the world is likely to prove selfdefeating for most individuals. Allan suggests that in this morally
pluralist world the best that I have to offer is "to think clearly" and that
this is a rather lame solution 3 This is not, in fact, what I propose.
What I suggest is that we should try to think clearly about an appropriate
institutional division of labour for vindicating all these values,
recognizing that they all command legitimate adherence. I believe that
one of the principal and, I hope, most useful contributions of the book is
to emphasize the centrality of the question of relative institutional
competence in deciding which of our various social and legal institutions
are best placed to vindicate each of the various core values that I review
and to which, I maintain, almost all of us subscribe in one context or
another. I do not believe that this suggestion is either vacuous or lame
but rather that it is an extremely important challenge. Moreover, no
matter how formidable the challenge, it seems to be, in principle, more
likely to lead to progress than does the attempt to formulate a metatheory that ranks or weighs the various core values to which most of us
subscribe. The latter is a task that has eluded moral and political
philosophers for almost 3,000 years, and one that does not seem likely to

12

Ibid. at 251.

13 Ibid at 242.
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be resolved in the near future; even if it were, it would attract Allan's
standard criticism that no truth is final but, rather, is historically and
politically contingent.
The third critique of my book developed by Allan is that I take
the market as a given and not as in need of moral justification, and
suggest that the burden of justifying intervention in markets lies on those
who propose it. I think that this criticism is unfair. The first chapter of
the book is mostly devoted to advancing both economic and political
arguments in favour of the market, rather than simply assuming that the
virtues of the market are self-evident, as well as to arraying a number of
fundamental critiques of the market. In citing Gauthier, with regard to
my discussion of commodification, to the effect that, "the perfect
market, were it realized, would constitute a morally free zone, a zone
within which the constraints of morality would have no place," I
emphasize, as does Gauthier, that in many contexts "morality arises from
market failures," and that substantial progress can be made in resolving
moral dilemmas by avoiding abstract concepts such as
"commodification" and "human flourishing."' 14 However, I recognize
that in focusing on actual or potential market or contracting failures
such as coercion, information failures, and externalities, these concepts
are themselves far from straightforward. Also, in the final chapter of the
book, in referring to "the unfinished normative agenda" even after
contracting and market failures have been fully addressed through one
legal instrumentality or another, I argue that the principal value left
unvindicated is distributive justice/ 5 Here I develop an extensive
argument for why the state should be involved actively in redistributive
programmes, principally directed to promoting the development of
human capital, which Allan is kind enough, in his closing comments, to
refer to as "an admirable and noble ambition. ' '16 In any event, when I
refer to "the burden of justifying intervention, 17 I do so in the specific
context of which categories of paternalism the law should be responsive
to, a context which Allan fails to identify. What I in fact argue is that,
beyond cases of cognitive incapacity and choices that do not reflect
underlying preferences (quite large categories), the case for paternalistic
legal interventions on grounds of contingent, adaptive, or bad
14 Trebilcock, supra note 2 at 29, citing D.P. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986) at 84.
15
Trebilcock, supra note 2 at 253.
16

Hutchinson, supra note 10 at 258.

17

Trebilcock, supranote 2 at 163.
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preferences becomes much more problematic, and the burden of
justifying intervention correspondingly much stronger, simply because
clearly definable individual preferences are being repudiated in the
absence of readily identifiable forms of coercion, information failure, or
externalities.
The fourth critique that Allan advances is that I do not take
seriously the endogeneity of preferences. In fact, I do not argue, as he
claims, that the challenge is to predict the kind of choices people would
"make in the absence of social, economic, legal or other influences that
have shaped these preferences,"1 8s but rather that others have argued
that individual choices often reflect preferences that are at variance with
the kinds of choices such individuals would make in the absence of these
influences. I explicitly distance myself from this argument, by pointing
out that it is potentially subversive of all traditional autonomy values/9
Moreover, I point out that that there is a fundamental circularity
problem with theories of endogenous preferences: presumably any form
of social, economic, or legal organization will be vulnerable to the same
claim, so that the validity of individual preferences will be open to
challenge ad infinitum.20 Allan claims that I am insensitive to the fact
that all preferences will reflect these broader influences. I am not, but to
view all preferences as suspect and unworthy of serious
respect-whatever the form of social, economic, or legal organization
which has shaped them-is a licence for tyranny and is directly
antithetical to the populist, participatory politics that Allan so
passionately advocates. Such politics are respectful of the worth of
individual viewpoints and values and are concerned that all individuals
have some reasonable opportunity to express them, and in turn be
influenced by the views and values offered by others.
In advocating a post-modernism that implies an egalitarian and
pluralist participatory democracy, Allan argues that attention must be
focused on the process in and through which people make substantive
decisions, and that participation in market activities, standing alone, is
an impoverished view of participatory possibilities that ought to be open
to citizens in a post-modern world. At one level, I do not disagree.
Indeed, in the final chapter in my book, I am critical of extreme forms of
Public Choice theory, precisely because they fail to take account of the
influence of ideas in collective decision-making processes and also
18

ibid. at 243.

19

Ibid.

20

ibid. at 158.
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because people are amenable to changing their views (or preferences) in
reasoned debate and discussion 1 Moreover, in proposing institutional
reforms that elevate reasoned argument and a principled justification in
the policy-making process, I explicitly emphasize that these institutional
reforms should promote the values of transparency, accountability, and
participation in collective decision making2 2 Again, with respect to the
role of the academy, I am critical of academics who write to each other,
typically within narrow parochial enclaves, or who, when not writing to
each other, advise the prince rather than the public, and thus fail to take
more seriously the proposition that many individual preferences are
socially constructed and amenable to revisions in the light of reasoned
argument and new evidence.
At another level, I fundamentally question Allan's overwhelming
preoccupation with process over substance. No matter how robust a
kind of participatory democracy one has in mind, and no matter how
successful efforts at energizing "the public square" may be, public
debates and discussions that are designed to permit the articulation and
antagonism of different forms of life must have a beginning and an
outcome (no matter how provisional and contingent). It is hard to get a
conversation started unless someone offers a provisional view. If
everyone takes the position that a provisional view is too presumptuous
and disrespectful of other participants in the conversation, there will be
a collective silence. My book was the result of presenting preliminary
ideas and then preliminary drafts to students in upper-year seminars and
debating the ideas passionately with them, by presenting drafts of
chapters to fellow academics at law schools and other academic
institutions throughout North America and elsewhere, and by presenting
the views elaborated in it (as I acknowledge in the preface) at informal
Friday night seminars at the Idler Pub to people from all walks of life
(not academics). The ideas were revised repeatedly through these
exchanges. This kind of process starts with a provisional set of ideas that
gets refined or rejected in the light of compelling criticisms or alternative
perspectives. To an important extent, the book is a chronicle of these
debates and this gives it the eclectic quality that other commentators
have noted. However, this process had to come to an end at some point,
at least if one wished to publish the debate up to that juncture, along
with whatever provisional views one arrived at in the process of the
debate. Hence the book is, of course, subject to further revisions in light
21

ibid at 265-68.

22 Ibid. at 267.
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of the views expressed in this volume, and those that may be advanced in
the future. But, more importantly, this process is necessarily replicated
in the broader polity, where the kinds of issues I canvass in the
book-such as surrogacy, prostitution, racial discrimination, and
immigration policy-require at least provisional policy responses. One
cannot leave these issues unresolved while one debates them forever.
One provisionally resolves them, continues to debate them, perhaps
leading to a reopening of the issues and some different resolution in the
future. In this sense, I agree with Allan that all public policy and legal
decisions are provisional and contingent, but that is not to say that there
are no decisions that need to be reached at any given point in time.
Thus, I am led to a major sense of puzzlement at the personal
level of my friendship with Allan. If he were teaching or writing about
contract law (defined expansively as I have done in the book), and were
he to be addressing one of the difficult and controversial issues that I
have addressed in the book, would his opening and final comment on the
issue be: "Let's talk about it," or "Let's keep talking about it?" To quote
Jerry Lee Lewis (who, I acknowledge, does not compare with William
Blake), "there's a whole lot of shakin' going on" in Allan's world, but is
there anything else? As a normative matter, I think Allan has a great
deal more to offer than this, which is why I value him so highly as a
friend, as long as our friendship does not require me to join him on the
other side of the post-modernist divide.
III. HAMISH STEWART, "WHERE IS THE FREEDOM IN
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT? A COMMENT ON
THE LIMITS OFFREEDOMOF
TREBILCOCK'S
CONTRACT' 23
Professor Stewart's principal line of critique of my book is that I
do not consider a particular understanding of autonomy wherein
freedom of choice is presupposed in the doctrines of contract law.
These doctrines treat the contracting parties as autonomous agents who
are free and equal in the sense that they have an abstract capacity to
enter into contracts. On this view, regardless of whether freedom of
contract is instrumentally or intrinsically valuable, it is an inescapable
aspect of contract law. He develops this critique by taking two sets of
examples: one from my discussion of commodification, and another
from my discussion of coercion.
23 (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L. 259.
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With respect to my discussion of commodification, Professor
Stewart focuses on the commercial surrogacy example, and on my
analysis of surrogacy contracts from both the autonomy and the welfare
perspectives. I conclude that from neither perspective are there grounds
for prohibiting outright commercial surrogacy contracts, but that there
are grounds for regulating them, much along the lines that we regulate
adoption decisions, and in particular by allowing the natural mother a
period of time following birth to revoke any prior decision to give up her
baby.
Professor Stewart, drawing on John Stuart Mill's famous
example of contracts of self-enslavement, argues that there must be
something that cannot be subject to contract, namely the agent's capacity
to contract on freedom and autonomy itself. He argues that it would be
contradictory to suppose that the very feature of an agent that made
contractual exchange possible could itself be permanently exchanged.
The agent would in effect be simultaneously denying and asserting his or
her capacity to contract or, in Mill's terms, the principle of freedom
cannot require that a person "should be free not to be free." 24 Professor
Stewart draws further support from Hegel, who argued that by alienating
the whole of one's time as crystallized in one's work and everything that
one produced, one would be making the substance of one's being (one's
universal activity and actuality, one's personality) into another's
property. Professor Stewart goes on to argue that reproductive capacity
may be so closely tied to a person's agency that it cannot be alienable,
and that if a mother cannot alienate her own agency, it would seem
equally implausible that she could be able to alienate her baby.
Professor Stewart concedes that "[t]hese arguments will not necessarily
be decisive against surrogacy contracts," but he is notably unforthcoming
in indicating what kinds of further considerations might properly weigh
on the other side? 5
I find his invocation of Mill and Hegel unhelpful in the surrogacy
context. Obviously, surrogacy contracts are not lifetime contracts for
self-enslavement or for the permanent alienation of the whole of one's
time. Whether reproductive capacity is so closely tied to a person's
agency that it cannot be alienable presumably requires some additional
line of argument. The analogy that I consistently invoke in my analysis
of surrogacy contracts relates to current adoption laws. Laws in Canada
and in most other jurisdictions around the world permit birth mothers to

24 J.S. Mill, On Libeny (New York: Macmillan, 1956) at 125.
25
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alienate their children through adoption, subject to various legal controls
and constraints. Why is this form of alienation any less objectionable
then surrogacy contracts, or is it equally objectionable? Moreover, a
woman's decision to abort a baby may be objectionable on the grounds
that it is a form of alienation inconsistent with the baby's own agency.
Does Professor Stewart's argument imply a pro-life position on
abortion? With respect to the argument that a woman's decision in a
surrogacy contract to temporarily alienate her reproductive capacity is
inconsistent with her human agency, does it follow that Professor
Stewart would criminalize, to an even greater extent than is currently the
case, prostitution and its surrounding activities? Mill's objections to
contracts of lifetime self-enslavement hardly seem helpful in working out
positions on any of these issues.
With regard to my discussion of coercion, Professor Stewart
presents a series of examples-some drawn from my book and others of
his own-to show that I would ultimately resolve these questions by
reference to a welfarist baseline that draws attention away from the
autonomy of the choosing agent. I accept as well-taken Professor
26
Stewart's criticism of my analysis of the lecherous millionaire example,
where I acknowledge that the objections to the transaction are less likely
to reside in issues of coercion than in the kind of issues of
commodification about which I had previously expressed some
scepticism. However, his other objection to my analysis of the coercion
issue rests on the distinction I draw between situational and structural
monopolies, and on the test I propose for resolving many coercion cases
with respect to situational monopolies. Here, I would ask whether the
situational monopolist has extracted terms from the other party that
substantially exceed the terms which would prevail with respect to this
class of transaction in a competitive market. He objects to me endowing
the competitive baseline with normative significance, although I should
note parenthetically that I am in good company here in that both
Professor Peter Benson and Professor James Gordley, in various
writings from a non-economic perspective, have argued for a rule of
equivalence or equality in exchange where, in measuring the
equivalences of goods exchanged, prices in reasonably competitive
markets would be used as the basic reference point 2 7 However, this is
not a complete rejoinder, because we may all be mistaken, albeit for
26

Trebilcock, supra note 2 at 90-91.

27 See P. Benson, "Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Non-distributive Conception of
Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory" (1989) 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 1077 [hereinafter
"Abstract Right"]; J. Gordley, "Equality in Exchange" (1981) 69 Calif. L. Rev. 1587.
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different reasons, in adopting this reference point. Perhaps Professor
Stewart has in mind a more medieval notional of the just price.
Professor Stewart presents two examples that he considers
particularly damaging to my analysis. The first is what he calls the
altruistic robber case, where an armed robber holds up a victim and
offers to pay him twice the value of his watch under threat of taking his
life. Because the consideration offered exceeds the competitive value of
the goods in question, on my test, applied without qualification, I would
be required to enforce this exchange, notwithstanding that the victim's
consent could scarcely be viewed as freely given. By way of reply, let me
say first that if this is the most damaging example for my analysis, its
quaint and other-worldly quality leaves me largely unperturbed.
However, if we wish to take the example seriously, I would be prepared
to concede to Professor Stewart that, in general,where a's proposal to 3
involves a threat to do a legal wrong to 3, this-independent of my
situational monopolist test-might properly be viewed as rendering the
proposal coercive. However, even here, I am more tentative than
Professor Stewart. I give the example in my book, modifying a wellknown slave example from Nozick where, in the modified circumstances,
the slave holds up his owner at gunpoint one night and demands his
freedom, to which the owner agrees.2 8 Should we enforce this
agreement despite the fact that the slave may be violating the existing
law in committing a tort or a crime, on the grounds that these are unjust
laws in this context, and that he has not violated the slave-owner's moral
baseline? In this case, we might well wish to enforce the agreement.
More generally, Professor Stewart's argument-that the best
account of coercion for the purposes of contract law is one that holds
that fl's act or promise was obtained by coercion only if a's proposal
contained a threat to do a legal wrong to fl-is an extremely "thin" or
impoverished theory of coercion, in that it will only readily apply to a
very small range of the standard contractual coercion cases. In most of
them (outside the gun-at-the-head type of cases), a's proposal to 3 does
not involve a legal wrong. For example, in the classic tug and foundering
ship case, the tug owner's proposal to rescue the ship but only in return
for an extravagant salvage fee entails no legal wrong on the part of the
tug owner to the foundering ship owner and crew. Moreover, the
argument does not readily address the lecherous millionaire example
that seems to concern Professor Stewart, nor does it readily address the
28 Trebilcock, supra note 2 at 80; R. Nozik, "Coercion" in S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes & M.
White, eds., Philosophy, Science and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1969) 440 at 450.
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starving peasant and the competitive rice merchant example, which he
also seems concerned about.2 9 With respect to this latter example, he
says that, "[a]ssuming that the [s]tarving [p]easant's situation is properly
described as one of unfreedom, and that we should do something about
it, Trebilcock's approach does not seem helpful." 30 I would argue the
same for Professor Stewart's approach. Moreover, I am not prepared to
assume that the starving peasant situation should be described as one of
unfreedom or that the competitive rice merchant's contract should be
viewed as coercive. I feel quite comfortable about the prospect of
enforcing this contract on much the same basis that Professor Stewart
feels comfortable in enforcing the competitive grocer contract21 Thus,
of all the various examples that he is concerned with, the only one that
his legal wrongdoing test would reach that my test would not is his
quaint altruistic robber case, and even then it would leave many other
objectionable cases of coercion unaddressed. It is true that he suggests
32
that, "at a minimum," the test of legal wrongdoing should be adopted.
However, rather like his unspecified additional considerations that might
be relevant in resolving the surrogacy case with respect to
commodification, Professor Stewart is notably unforthcoming as to what
additional tests or considerations might properly be invoked to resolve
coercion cases that do not fall under this legal wrongdoing test. It is not
obvious to me that this constitutes conceptual progress.
IV. PETER BENSON, "THE IDEA OF A PUBLIC BASIS OF
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTRACT" 33
Of all the commentators in this volume, Professor Benson
presents, by far, the most comprehensive and ambitious set of reactions
to my book, particularly with respect to the foundational theoretical
perspectives on contract law. I have found his comments the most
difficult to deal with for two reasons. First, he offers so much by way of
incisive and, indeed, decisive critiques of existing normative theories of
contract, but on the other hand, in suggesting an alternative theoretical

29 Stewart, supra note 23 at 266-69.
30
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31 IbiL
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OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 33 No. 2

framework for viewing contract law, he offers so little that is concretely
constructive.
As to my first level of response, Professor Benson offers a
dazzling synthesis and critique of the major efficiency, autonomy, and
welfare-based theories of contract law. His description and evaluation
of these theories is a tour de force, and I agree with almost all of his
analysis. My only (self-interested) concern is that his treatment is so
clear and compelling that it probably makes reading the more laboured
treatment of these issues in my book dispensable for many readers,
although the same cannot be said for the applications of the competing
theoretical frameworks to particular problematic issues in contract law
(an issue to which I will return in a moment).
Having so devastatingly critiqued all the major extant theories of
contract law, Professor Benson naturally must then confront the
awesome challenge implicit in his critiques-that of offering an
alternative normative theory of contract law that is not vulnerable to the
criticisms he has so effectively brought home to existing theories. Here,
the paper understandably is much less satisfying in that it barely begins
to sketch what such an alternative theory-what Professor Benson calls a
public basis of justification for contract-would look like, obviously
presaging further work on his part.in this area. In approaching this task,
his strategy is to discern a set of minimalist and non-controversial
features of contract law ("the immanent structure"?), such as the
distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance and the award of
expectation damages for breach of contract, and to extrapolate from this
set of core features and the values that inhere in them (a particular
conception of human autonomy or human agency) the doctrinal
implications for all the major areas of contract law.3 4 In contrast to the
approach I adopted in my book, Professor Benson does not move from
his theoretical premises to their application to particular doctrinal or
other concrete contractual issues. The result is that we have no way of
evaluating how persuasive we might find the logic behind either the
selection of the foundational premises or the detailed set of doctrinal
implications claimed to flow logically from those premises.
However, at this point let me register a tentative note of
scepticism about this enterprise. First, I am concerned about the general
methodological approach employed: Professor Benson's normative
theory of contract is derived by observing what contract law currently is,
at least in its most fundamental structural features. Thus prescriptions
will presumably be offered on the form that particular doctrines might
34
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take, or according to which resolutions of particular contractual
controversies are appropriate. As with Professor Ernest Weinrib's
approach to tort law,3 5 which clearly parallels the approach Professor
Benson seems to suggest in developing a new normative theory of
contract law, I am puzzled by what appears to be something of a
naturalistic fallacy: by positively observing certain features of existing
contract law, normative implications can be derived by formulating
detailed doctrinal rules that allegedly "cohere" with the fundamental
premises in some internally rational or logical framework. I have argued
that Professor Posner, for example, has been guilty of this sin in
6
developing an efficiency thesis of the common law2 When he looks at
the common law, including the law of tort and contract, he observes
rules everywhere that appear to reflect efficiency considerations and
thus, in the light of this normative value, he seeks to explain all detailed
doctrinal rules. However, this opens up significant room for controversy
as to what one observes even when looking at a minimalist set of
structural features of an area of law like contracts, and the values that
might be said to inhere in these features. Moreover, Professor Posner
has been relatively cavalier in moving from positive observations about
the efficiency of particular features of the common law to offering
normative prescriptions for reformulating rules that do not appear to
accord with an efficiency perspective. That is, he moves from the
positive to the normative and commits, in my view, the naturalistic
fallacy. I am not sure whether Professor Benson, starting from a
different set of premises, will be able to avoid the same dangers.
Second, implicit in both Professor Weinrib's work on tort law
approach that Professor Benson suggests should be taken in
the
and in
developing a new normative theory of contract law, is an assumption
about what constitutes, in the present case, contract law. Just as
Professor Weinrib regards alternative accident compensation and
regulatory schemes as outside the purview of his analysis, which focuses
entirely on deriving an internally consistent set of tort doctrines from the
immanent form and structure of tort law, and just as he regards
questions of whether tort law should be displaced by alternative
compensation and regulatory regimes as "political" decisions about
which he has nothing to say, Professor Benson appears to be assuming a
35 See, for example, E.J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1995).
36
R.A. Posner, EconcomicAnalysis of Law, 4th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1992); M.J.
Trebilcock, The Common Law Restraint of Trade: A Legal and Economic Analysis (Toronto:
Carswell, 1986) at 391-407.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 33 NO. 2

domain for contract law where a similar maneuver is possible. However,
in most areas of contract law, we observe a complex mix of common law
doctrine, statutory rights and obligations, regulatory constraints, and the
like. What part of contract law is he purporting both to explain and to
provide a normative justification or theory for, and what part of the
whole body of law that impacts on contractual relationships falls outside
his domain of inquiry? With respect to those areas of contract law that
fall outside his domain of inquiry, what normative benchmarks, if any,
can properly be brought to bear in evaluating the wisdom of existing or
proposed legislative or regulatory policies, or are these simply "political"
decisions about which we as scholars have nothing useful to say?
Moreover, even within the more limited domain of inquiry that
Professor Benson appears to implicitly assume, I have yet to be
persuaded that his approach will yield the clear doctrinal implications
that he foreshadows from his austere set of structural premises. For
example, in his discussion of mistake and frustration, he argues that a
public justification for contract law, unlike an economic approach that
would ask prospectively how the parties, as rational persons, would have
wished to allocate the risks in order to maximize the mutual gains from
trade, the public justification would be retrospective and would seek to
uncover the actual allocation of risks that was established by the parties'
consent, explicitly or implicitly. This approach, similar to that adopted
by Professor Triantis, who writes from a law and . economics
perspective, 3 7 seems to assume that all contracts are complete,
contingent-claims contracts and that there is no such thing as an
incomplete contract, i.e. a contract with gaps where particular
contingencies have simply not been addressed at all, either explicitly or
implicitly, by the parties. As I have suggested earlier in my rejoinder to
Professor Craswell, I find this claim to be so extreme as to be
implausible. Moreover, it invites a rather sterile exercise in semantics
where courts, in the guise of interpreting the express or implied
intentions of the parties will, as in the earlier history of the doctrine of
frustration, imply terms that allocate the risk in question by reference to
the implicit intention of the parties. The intention or consent of the
parties, however, is superfluous to this enterprise and is nothing more
than a judicial cover for supplying the missing terms in the contract.
With regard to what these missing terms should look like, once one
abandons the unrealistic assumption that a particular set of terms has
been explicitly or implicitly consented to, one is in the kind of realm that
I explore in constructing a set of background terms or default rules on
37
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some rough-and-ready welfare judgments, leaving the parties to contract
ex ante around these rules if they choose (thus leaving room for the
vindication of autonomy values). Thus, I am sceptical that Professor
Benson's analysis will, ultimately, enable him to avoid these kinds of
welfare judgments.
My scepticism is intensified when I review earlier writing by
Professor Benson in this area. In his article "Abstract Right," he argues
that the common will evidenced by two parties to a contract, and
reflecting the free and equal moral personality to which each is entitled
simply by virtue of being human, leads to an inference that only
38
equivalence in exchange fully respects their equal individual autonomy.
In measuring the equivalences of goods or other resources exchanged,
he proposes that prices in reasonably competitive markets be used as a
basic reference point. But what are these prices? They prices reflect the
aggregation of preferences by both suppliers and demanders in these
markets, and essentially provide what economists would regard as a
welfare measure of value. Thus, economists are likely to see Benson's
concept of equivalence in exchange (or Gordley's theory of equality in
exchange)3 9 as centrally derived from a welfare measure. It is difficult
for me to see how such measures can be squared with any purely internal
Moreover, while attracting
theory of individual autonomy.
endorsements from the "right," it will attract criticisms from those on
the "left" who view market prices as a bizarre normative benchmark,
reflecting (as they do) endogenous preferences, inequalities in prior
endowments, and historical, institutional, and political contingencies.
How Professor Benson plans to steer between Scylla and Charybdis is
something we will await with interest in his future work.
V. GILLIAN K. HADFIELD, "THE DILEMMA OF CHOICE

' 40

Professor Hadfield's comments take seriously my scepticism
about the convergence claims often made on behalf of private
ordering-that they simultaneously promote autonomy and welfare, and
explore the implications of a lack of convergence between the two from
a feminist perspective. Most of what she has to say I agree with.
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However, let me note one point of disagreement and then extend her
insights in a couple of directions.
While I certainly believe, and claim in my book, that autonomy
and welfare sometimes diverge, I do not make the much stronger claim
that they always diverge which, in relation to the experience of women,
Professor Hadfield comes close to accepting when she states that "choice
promotes [a woman's] autonomy on the one hand but diminishes her
welfare on the other."41 Even in the problematic cases for feminists
which she and I focus on-such as surrogacy, separation agreements,
and prostitution-the claim that choice promotes a woman's autonomy
but simultaneously diminishes her welfare requires clear identification of
the alternative courses of action available. Even in these very difficult
contexts it is not obvious to me that, in the great majority of cases,
choice reduces a woman's welfare relative to the other options available
to her. It is, of course, entirely legitimate to decry the absence of a
richer menu of non-demeaning and self-fulfilling life choices in many of
these contexts and to advocate public policies that would enlarge the
choice set. However, amongst these policies, the prohibition of the
problematic activity, standing alone, seems unlikely to increase women's
welfare, while clearly constraining their autonomy. This is also true of a
number of other related contexts on which Professor Hadfield does not
directly comment, such as decisions by women to give up their babies for
adoption or to have an abortion. These are often anguishing decisions
made in contexts where the feasible alternatives are extremely
constrained, and where, in some cases, these decisions will be followed
regretted subsequently. However, in the absence of empirical evidence
that these choices in most cases are subsequently regretted relative to
the feasible alternatives, the fact that in some cases these decisions may
be subsequently regretted hardly provides a basis for a generic
prohibition. Thus, I believe that Professor Hadfield sets up the dilemma
of choice too starkly.
I have claimed above and argue more fully in my book that
prohibition, standing alone, will almost never have the effect of
enlarging the available choice set for women. I say "almost never"
because I think there are some cases where prohibition, in the long run,
may have this effect. For example, the passage of the factories acts and
related legislation in Britain in the first half of the nineteenth century,42
which prohibited children under a certain age from working in mines
41
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and factories, may well have diminished their welfare and that of their
families in the short term, but arguably provided an important political
impetus in the longer term for the development of a public and
universally accessible system of primary and, later, secondary schooling.
One would similarly need to ask, in the contexts with which Professor
Hadfield is concerned, whether prohibition of, for example, surrogacy
contracts, separation agreements, or prostitution, might set in motion a
longer term political dynamic ultimately leading to the adoption of
public policies that would significantly enlarge women's life choices. I
am somewhat sceptical that political constituencies immediately affected
by such prohibitions are likely to be sufficiently salient as to significantly
change or intensify the political dynamics favouring the adoption of
other choice-enhancing public policies, for example, in the domain of
education, the workplace, child-care, or social welfare policy. Of course,
many women and men will favour the adoption of choice-enhancing
public policies in these areas, but it is not clear to me how the
prohibition of problematic activities, such as surrogacy or prostitution, is
likely to represent a useful first step in a political strategy directed to
these ends.
Having said this, I am acutely sensitive throughout the book to
the vulnerability of women in making choices in contexts where both the
immediate relational setting and larger historical and social forces often
imply high degrees of subjugation, subordination, and dependency.
However, my response to these concerns is to attempt to identify legal or
regulatory mechanisms that strengthen and protect the choice processes,
without removing altogether the ability of women to ultimately choose
for themselves, provided these procedural protections are satisfied.
Thus, in the separation agreement context, I propose a sixty-day coolingoff period after the signing of a separation agreement, a requirement of
independent legal advice, and an ability on the part of either party to
such an agreement to challenge the agreement subsequently before a
court on grounds of unconscionability, if the agreement generates
substantially inferior net benefits for that party relative to those that
could have been obtained under, an appropriately structured set of
default rules. Similarly, in the case of surrogacy, I would allow the socalled surrogate mother the right to opt out of the agreement within a
short period after giving birth to the child, thus applying rules similar to
those governing the revocation of consent in adoption cases, rules that
apply in many jurisdictions around the world. However, removing the
possibility of choice altogether, as prohibition would, runs the serious
risk of infantilizing women through a new form of paternalism or
parentalism, and undermines the strong claim to autonomy that women
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have fought so fiercely and bravely for in other contexts, such as access
to abortion and contraception.
This is not to claim, of course, that any set of procedural
protections that might be devised to strengthen the choice process can
ever ensure that there will not be cases of subsequent regret or a
reduction in women's welfare as a result of prior choices that have been
made. This is true of all individuals who face important and difficult
decisions in their lives, such as educational and career options, marriage,
and so on. Nevertheless, there is a subset of decisions that women alone
sometimes face where special concern seems to me to be warranted.
These concerns are exemplified in several recent high-profile and widely
discussed decisions of the House of Lords43 involving the doctrine of
undue influence. The basic fact pattern in these cases involves a wife
consenting to a mortgage on the matrimonial home in favour of her
bank or other financial institution to secure indebtedness of the
husband, typically incurred in his business, where the business
subsequently fails and the bank seeks then to enforce the mortgage
against the matrimonial home. Cases such as these have typically
involved traditional marital relationships, with a fairly sharp division of
labour between husband and wife, where the wife usually defers to the
husband in most business and financial matters and is, in turn,
dependent on his income-generating activities. In such contexts, the
parties to the agreement often have interdependent, as opposed to
independent, utility functions; that is, the welfare of the other party to
the agreement significantly matters to the first party in addition to, or
instead of, the first party's own welfare. In these circumstances, the
wife's consent to the transaction may appear suspect. However, this
implicitly assumes that the appropriate normative benchmark for
autonomous or genuinely consensual decision making is an arm's length,
impersonal, non-affective relationship, and that self-sacrificing or
altruistic behaviour, which presumably should often be celebrated and
vindicated (as argued by Carol Gilligan), 44 can also often become selfdestructive and, if it becomes so, should be discouraged. Framing
appropriate legal rules in this kind of context is thus extremely difficult.
One might, for example, require the bank or financial institution to fully
explain the terms of the security arrangements to the wife. One might
insist further that this be done in the absence of the husband. One might
43
Barclays Bank v. O'Brien (1993), [1994] 1 A.C. 180 (H.L.); C.LB.C. Mortgagesv. Pitt (1993),
[1994] 1 A.C. 200 (H.L.). See also NationalWestminsterBank v. Morgan, [1985] 1 A.C. 686 (C.A.).
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go further and require that the financial institution insist that the wife
obtain independent legal advice. Or one could go further still and
prohibit financial institutions from entering into arrangements where the
legal or other advice recommends that the wife not enter into the
transaction. Some feminists take the view that any rule short of the last
option reflects a formal notion of equality that will be, insensitive to
power imbalances that often afflict these relationships, rendering many
of these procedural protections largely empty gestures 4 5 However, as in
the other contexts discussed above, I am sceptical of altogether removing
from women the ultimate ability to choose and, indeed, to do so for selfsacrificial or altruistic reasons, if they are so inclined. While it would
seem prudent for the law of contracts to insist on some procedural
protections in these cases, it is difficult for me to see how these
protections should extend beyond requiring independent legal advice to
requiring that it must be followed. To go further would be tantamount
to a prohibition and would, again, fail to take women's autonomy
seriously.
Finally, let me re-emphasize a recurring refrain of mine
throughout my book: we should not ask the law of contracts to carry all
the freight for vindicating every important social value or every
important public policy objective. Governments have a rich array of
policy instruments available to them, and devising an appropriate
institutional division of labour so that instruments and objectives are
appropriately matched seems, to me, to represent one of the major
policy challenges of our time.

45 See, for example, D. Otto, "A Barren Future? Equity's Conscience and Woman's
Inequality" (1992) 18 Melb. U.L. Rev. 808.

